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In this article we interrogate the recognition of rivers as legal persons in Aotearoa New 
Zealand (Whanganui River) and Colombia (Río Atrato). Although the legal, political, 
historical and cultural context for recognition is different in each country, an analysis 
of the cases presents some interesting conceptual correlations, which help us to 
understand this emerging (and sometimes controversial) transnational idea that a river 
can be a person. In both cases recognising that the river is a person is an attempt to 
accommodate diverse legal and cultural interests in the river, in order to establish a new 
collaborative relationship between the state and river communities. Whether either 
model results in improved river outcomes, or increased indigenous or community 
jurisdiction to govern, turns not on the fiction that the river is a person but on the 
surrounding institutional framework, which has been carefully designed to engender 
enforceability. Thus, we argue, traditional dichotomies that draw lines between human-
centred and earth-centred laws or as the object versus the subject of property or rights 
fail to capture what legal personality entails.  
 
Ahora es el momento de comenzar a tomar las primeras medidas para proteger de 
forma eficaz al planeta y a sus recursos antes de que sea demasiado tarde o el daño 
sea irreversible, no solo para las futuras generaciones sino para la especie humana.
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Now is the moment to begin to take the first steps effectively to protect the planet and 
its resources before it is too late or the damage is irreversible, not just for future 




In the past year there have been two discrete cases, in very different parts of the world, 
where rivers have been declared to be ‘legal persons’.3 Much academic and political 
attention has been given to the case of the Whanganui River in Aotearoa, New Zealand, 
declared by legislation to be a legal person in March 2017.4 Less well known is the case 
of the Río Atrato in Colombia, recognised as a legal person by the domestic 
Constitutional Court in November 2016, in a decision not released publicly until May 
2017.5 Both cases have been lauded by environmentalists as the personification of the 
inherent rights of nature.6 But what does it mean to recognise that a river is a legal 
person in such vastly different places? In the particular contexts in which the Colombian 
and New Zealand cases have taken place, what is the nature and content of the rights 
that are recognised?  
 
In this article the key features of the legal person model adopted in each of the New 
Zealand and Colombian cases are interrogated and the challenges posed by those 
 
3 Elizabeth Macpherson, Erin O’Donnell and Felipe Clavijo Ospina, ‘Meet the River People: Who 
Speaks for the Rivers?’ Stuff, 2 April 2018 http://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/102741097/meet-the-
river-people-who-speaks-for-the-rivers; Elizabeth Macpherson and Erin O’Donnell ‘¿Necesitan 
Derechos Los Ríos? Comparando Estructuras Legales Para Regulación de Ríos En Nueva Zelanda, 
Australia y Chile [Do Rivers Need Rights? Comparing Legal Structures for River Regulation in New 
Zealand, Australia and Chile]’ Paper presented to the Jornadas de Derecho de Aguas, Pontificia 
Universidad Catolica de Chile, 2017; Erin O’Donnell ‘At the intersection of the sacred and the legal: 
rights for nature in Uttarakhand, India’ (2018) 30(1) Journal of Environmental Law 1; Katherine 
Sanders ‘“Beyond human ownership”? Property, power, and legal personality for nature in Aotearoa 
New Zealand’ (2017) Journal of Environmental Law 1.  
4 Indicative of its significance, an opinion piece on the Te Awa Tupua Act by O’Donnell and Talbot-
Jones on The Conversation attained more than 120,000 views in the space of three months. See Erin 
O’Donnell and Julia Talbot-Jones ‘Three rivers are now legally people – but that’s just the start of 
looking after them’ (The Conversation 2017) http://theconversation.com/three-rivers-are-now-legally-
people-but-thats-just-the-start-of-looking-after-them-74983. 
5 Tierra Digna (n 2).  
6 See eg Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature Rights of Nature 
https://therightsofnature.org/?p=37208. 
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features in the local context explored.7 It is argued that, although there are obvious 
contextual differences, there are interesting commonalities in the recognition of rivers 
as legal persons across the New Zealand and Colombian models, which might herald 
the emergence of a (loose) transnational concept of legal rights for rivers. Legal person 
models are typically presented as indicative of an ‘ecocentric’ tendency in the 
regulation of natural resources, in which nature is the subject rather than the object of 
rights.8 However, the New Zealand and Colombian cases are ‘culturally located’, in the 
sense that river rights are a consequence of the recognition of the (human) rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples as river communities. Further, while the implementation 
of the Colombian and New Zealand models has just begun, in both cases the efficacy 





<A>2 The pluralism of river rights 
 
<B>2.1 Legal personality as ecocentrism 
 
Rivers have long been valued for their utility, both economic and social, to humans. 
Legal frameworks that regulate the management and use of water have done so with 
these values in mind – water resources must be efficiently allocated and managed so 
that humans might continue to benefit from them. This approach, known in the field of 
natural resources regulation as an ‘anthropocentric’ one, has formed the basis for water 
 
7 In this article a contextual approach to comparative legal research is taken, by analysing laws and 
policies in their historical, economic, cultural or political contexts. See A Esin Orucu ‘Methodology of 
comparative law’ in J M Smits Elgar (ed) Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2006) 442, 445; Mark van Hoeke ‘Deep level comparative law’ in Mark van Hoeke (ed) Epistemology 
and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart Publishing 2004) 165, 165; Maurice Adams ‘Doing what 
doesn’t come naturally. On the distinctiveness of comparative law’ in Mark van Hoecke (ed) 
Methodologies of Legal Research : What Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 
Publishing 2011) 238; Douglas W Vick ‘Interdisciplinarity and the discipline of law’ (2004) 31(2) 
Journal of Law and Society 163, 184.  
8 See eg Meg Good ‘The river as a legal person: evaluating nature rights-based approaches to 
environmental protection in Australia’ (2013) 1 National Environmental Law Review 34; Michelle 
Maloney ‘Building an alternative jurisprudence for the earth: the International Rights of Nature 
Tribunal’ (2016) 1 Vermont Law Review 129; Vito de Lucia ‘Towards an ecological philosophy of law: 
a comparative discussion’ (2013) 4(2) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 167. 
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laws throughout the world, both at international level and within domestic laws and 
policies.9  
 
Pursuant to an alternative ‘ecocentric’ theory, nature is conceived of as the object of 
rights, and not merely a subject for human exploitation.10 Conversely, humans, who 
have historically used and abused natural resources, owe obligations to nature, to 
protect nature’s rights and interests. Ecocentrism evolved out of deep or green ecology 
movements of the 1960s, which opposed anthropocentrism and its propertised, 
utilitarian view of nature.11 In law, ecocentrism inspired the development of ‘earth 
jurisprudence’, which emphasises that ‘humanity and the non-human world belong to 
the same moral order’ as members of earth’s community,12 demanding fundamental 
change in law and regulation.13 Proponents of earth jurisprudence often point to a 
dichotomy between human rights to property in natural resources versus the inherent, 
inalienable rights of nature.14 Somewhat ironically, earth jurisprudence has co-opted 
the very human concept of ‘rights’ to secure nature’s protection.15 
 
The first example typically put forward of such ecocentric laws comes from Ecuador, 
where the rights of ‘Pachamama’ (Mother Earth) were recognised and protected in the 
2008 Constitution.16 In 2009 Bolivia also recognised the rights of Mother Nature in its 
 
9 Elisa Morgera and Kati Kulovesi Research Handbook on International Law and Natural Resources 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 5; B Donnelly and P Bishop ‘Natural law and ecocentrism’ (2006) 
19(1) Journal of Environmental Law 89, 90; Catherine J Irons Magallanes ‘Maori cultural rights in 
Aotearoa New Zealand: protecting the cosmology that protects the environment’ (2015) 21(2) Widener 
Law Review 273, 275. 
10 Good (n 8) 34. Good suggests that it could be argued that the Earth has a ‘right to life’, and it is from 
this right that the rights of nature are sourced. 
11 Christopher D Stone Should Trees Have Standing? : Law, Morality, and the Environment (Oxford 
University Press 2010). 
12 See de Lucia (n 8) 188; Thomas Berry The Great Work : Our Way into the Future (Bell Tower 1999) 
4.  
13 Michelle Maloney and Peter Burdon Wild Law: In Practice (Taylor and Francis 2014); Maloney (n 
8) 132; Sophia Imran, Khorshed Alam and Narelle Beaumont ‘Reinterpreting the definition of 
sustainable development for a more ecocentric reorientation: reinterpreting the definition of sustainable 
development’ (2014) 22(2) Sustainable Development 134; Arturo Escobar Encountering Development: 
The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton University Press 1995).  
14 Abigail Hutchison ‘Whanganui River as a legal person’ (2014) 3 Alternative Law Journal (Gaunt) 
179, 179; Mari Margil ‘The standing of trees: why nature needs legal rights’ (2017) 34(2) World Policy 
Journal 8. 
15 According to liberal political theory, ‘rights’ protect ‘fundamental human interests’. See Duncan 
Ivison ‘The logic of Aboriginal rights’ (2003) 3(3) Ethnicities 321, 322–24.  
16 Constitución de la República del Ecuador 2008 (Ecuador). 
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Constitution and Law of the Rights of Mother Earth.17 A number of recent legal and 
political developments concerning the rights of nature have involved declarations that 
rivers are ‘legal persons’: that is, that rivers are the subject of legal rights and have the 
necessary standing to sue and be sued, enter into contracts, and hold property in their 
own name.18 In most Western legal systems, at least those evolving out of the Roman 
law tradition, ‘legal persons’ are restricted to natural persons (individuals), corporations, 
and ships. 19  Giving rivers legal personality is intended to provide them with the 
standing humans and corporations have to protect their interests against others, where 
necessary in the courts.20  
 
The first legislative recognition of a river as a legal person occurred in New Zealand in 
March 2017, when the Whanganui River (Te Awa Tupua) was declared to be a legal 
person under a political settlement between the New Zealand government and Māori of 
the Whanganui Iwi (tribe).21 The Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) 
Act 2017 (Te Awa Tupua Act) declares that the Whanganui River is a legal person, 
with ‘all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person’22 and devises a 
complicated collaborative governance regime, presided over by a ‘guardian’ called ‘Te 
Pou Tupua’, to act in the interests of the river and enforce its rights.23  
 
The legal person approach appears to be gaining some transnational traction. A similar 
approach was adopted by a regional Court for rivers in India in April 2017,24 although 
the decisions are currently subject to appeal. 25  In May of the same year the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia released its decision recognising the Río Atrato as a 
 
17 Constitución Política del Estado 2009 (Bolivia); Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra (Ley 071) 2010 
(Bolivia). 
18 S M Solaiman ‘Legal personality of robots, corporations, idols and chimpanzees: a quest for 
legitimacy’ (2017) 2 Artificial Intelligence and Law 155, 157. 
19 M Davies and N Naffine Are Persons Property? Legal Debates about Property and Personality 
(Ashgate Publishing 2001). 
20 Erin O’Donnell Constructing the Aquatic Environment as a Legal Subject: Legal Rights, Market 
Participation, and the Power of Narrative (PhD Thesis, University of Melbourne 2017). 
21 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) (Te Awa Tupua Act). In this 
article, for simplicity, reference is made to the ‘Whanganui Iwi’, although it is acknowledged that a 
number of other iwi (tribes) and hapu (subtribes) have interests in the Whanganui River.  
22 ibid s 14. 
23 ibid s 18. 
24 Mohd Salim v State of Uttarakhand & Others (20 March 2017) High Court of Uttarakhand (WPPIL 
126/2014) (India). 
25 The Indian case was recognised in recognition of the spiritual relationships of Hindu communities 
with the river, rather than a specific indigenous or tribal relationship. See O’Donnell (n 3). 
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legal person.26 Further law suits seeking declarations that the Colorado River is a legal 
person have been filed in October 2017 in the United States.27  
 
These cases, although each exists in its own particular social, historical and political 
circumstances, have been seized by proponents of rights for nature as the embodiment 
of an ecocentric approach to natural resource regulation.28 Proponents of rights for 
nature believe that giving rivers legal personality reflects their inherent value (not 
simply as a resource to be exploited) and will enhance the protection of water resources 
from humans who would do them harm. However, at least in the New Zealand and 
Colombian contexts, this purported ‘ecocentric shift’ involving rivers has been largely 
driven by indigenous and tribal communities, who claim distinct relationships with 
water based on their cosmovision of guardianship, symbiosis and respect, as opposed 
to Western liberal utilitarianism. This, within each country’s context, suggests that the 
river person models may in fact be ‘anthropocentric’; as an attempt to recognise 
indigenous and tribal conceptions of the natural world and human relationships with 
and obligations to nature, raising doubt about the usefulness of the 
ecocentric/anthropocentric divide. 
 
<B>2.2 Legal personality and legal pluralism 
 
In this article it is argued that the legal person models used in New Zealand and 
Colombia should best be understood, not merely as recognition of nature’s inherent 
rights, but as recognition of such rights as an incident of the (human) rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples with respect to river territories. The idea that states must 
‘recognise’ indigenous groups, and their ongoing rights to land and resources, the 
central claim of the international indigenous rights movement, 29  is inadequately 
 
26 Tierra Digna. 
27 Julie Turkewitz ‘Corporations have rights. Why shouldn’t rivers?’ New York Times (26 September 
2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/does-the-colorado-river-have-rights-a-lawsuit-seeks-to-
declare-it-a-person.html. 
28 See eg Laura Villa ‘The importance of the Atrato River in Colombia gaining legal rights’ (5 May 
2017) Earth Law Centre https://www.earthlawcenter.org/new-blog-1/2017/5/the-importance-of-the-
atrato-river-in-colombia-gaining-legal-rights. 
29 Elizabeth Macpherson ‘Beyond recognition: lessons from Chile for allocating indigenous water 
rights in Australia (2017)’ (2017) 40(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1130; Glen Sean 
Coulthard Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (University of 
Minnesota Press 2014) 1–2; Nancy Fraser ‘From redistribution to recognition? Dilemmas of justice in a 
“post-socialist” age’ 1995 212 New Left Review 68.  
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theorised30 and ultimately unsettled.31 The need for recognition often draws directly or 
indirectly on theories of ‘legal pluralism’; on the basis that indigenous rights and law 
exist independently of state law and should be recognised by the state.32 Recognition is 
sometimes considered desirable because indigenous peoples have a right to recognition 
of their distinct cultural identity, or due to their prior or ‘first’ status as inhabitants of 
colonised territories.33 Such arguments draw on theories of ‘reparative justice’, which 
encourage ‘amending past wrongs’34 and repairing deteriorated relationships between 
indigenous groups and the state.35 
 
Laws that provide for indigenous relationships with natural resources, including for 
example the common law doctrine of native or aboriginal title, use this terminology of 
recognition and are typically explained with reference to theories of legal pluralism.36 
This is the context against which laws that declare rivers as ‘legal persons’ have 
developed and, as will be explained here, both the New Zealand and Colombian cases 
‘recognise’ cultural water relationships as reparative solutions to historical injustice 
involving indigenous (and tribal) groups. Moreover, as well as recognising indigenous 
relationships with natural resources, the legal person models recognise indigenous 
jurisdictions:37  for the exercise of indigenous management obligations towards the 
natural world as guardians.  
 
30 Ivison (n 15), 329; Jeremy Waldron ‘Why is indigeneity important?’ (American Political Science 
Association 2005) 1, 81–82. 
31 For some examples of different theories of indigenous rights see Brian M Barry Culture and 
Equality : An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Polity 2001); Helen Hughes Lands of Shame : 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander ‘Homelands’ in Transition (Centre for Independent Studies 
2007); Chandran Kukathas ‘Are there any cultural rights?’ (1992) 1 Political Theory 105. 
32 Kirsty Gover ‘Legal pluralism and state-indigenous relations in Western settler societies’ 
(International Council on Human Rights Policy 2009). 
33 See Will Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship : A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford 
University Press 1995); Charles Taylor ‘The politics of recognition’ in Amy Gutmann (ed) 
Multiculturalism : Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press 1994) 25–33; 
Karen Engle The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development : Rights, Culture, Strategy (Duke 
University Press 2010) 55; James Tully Strange Multiplicity (Cambridge University Press 1995) 184. 
34 See Margaret Urban Walker What Is Reparative Justice? (Marquette University Press 2010) 9. 
35 See Damien Short Reconciliation and Colonial Power : Indigenous Rights in Australia (Ashgate 
2008) 15; John Horton ‘Political legitimacy, justice and consent’ (2012) 15(2) Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 129, 130.  
36 Mabo and Others v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) CLR 175 (Mabo) 53 (Brennan J); Elizabeth 
Macpherson Commercial Indigenous Water Rights in Australian Law: Lessons from Chile (PhD 
Thesis, University of Melbourne 2016) 43–47; Noel Pearson ‘The concept of native title at common 
law’ (1997) 5 Australian Humanities Review. 
37 See Jeremy Webber ‘Beyond regret: Mabo’s implications for Australian constitutionalism’ in 
Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton and Will Sanders (eds) Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Cambridge University Press 2000) 60, regarding the recognition of indigenous autonomy in 
the recognition of indigenous title.  
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However, it is clear from the legal pluralism literature that recognition mechanisms do 
not preserve indigenous law, or indigenous jurisdictions, in their pristine, pre-contact 
state, and there is an inevitable process of ‘accommodation’ in laws that recognise 
indigenous interests. 38  They are, as Webber explains, ‘mediated rights’. 39  As a 
consequence, state laws that provide for indigenous rights are often accused of 
translating, transforming, and ‘essentialising’ indigenous interests in order to 
accommodate them within state law, and failing to account for the continually changing 
state of indigenous law.40 Where states declare rivers as legal persons in New Zealand 
and Colombia, they are recognising and accommodating indigenous jurisdictions, all 
the while mediating and limiting indigenous cultures. 
 
3 Te Awa Tupua: the Whanganui River as a legal person in Aotearoa New 
Zealand 
 
<B>3.1 Rivers and peoples in Whanganui  
 
The Whanganui River has always occupied a highly contested space in New Zealand 
legal and political history.41 The Māori who live alongside the river and depend on it 
for their physical and spiritual sustenance, the Whanganui Iwi, have been concerned 
about river ownership and management from the onset of British colonisation. When 
the British acquired sovereignty in New Zealand, with the signing of the Treaty of 
Waitangi in 1840, Whanganui Iwi became concerned about the British assertion of 
rights of management and ownership of the river. The first petitions were made by 
Whanganui Iwi regarding the impact of settlement on their access to and use of the river 
in the 1870s.42 A series of court cases concerning the river ran from 1938 to 1962, in 
what was one of longest pieces of litigation in New Zealand history, during which the 
Whanganui Iwi consistently maintained that they had rights of ownership and tino 
 
38 See Arif Bulkan ‘Disentangling the sources and nature of indigenous rights: a critical examination of 
common law jurisprudence’ (2012) 61(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 823, 835. 
39 Webber (n 37) 63–70. 
40 Glen Coulthard ‘Subjects of empire: indigenous peoples and the politics of recognition in Canada’ 
(2007) 6(4) Contemporary Political Theory 437, 437; C A Zorzi ‘The “irrecognition” of Aboriginal 
customary law’ (2000) 5; Webber (n 37) 64–66; Rutgerd Boelens ‘The politics of disciplining water 
rights’ (2009) 40(2) Development and Change 307, 316–20. 
41 See Sanders (n 3). 
42 Waitangi Tribunal ‘Whanganui River Report’ (Wai 167 1999) 55–56. 
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rangatiratanga (sovereignty) over the river. 43  The Iwi were concerned about their 
continued access to and use of the river for food gathering, navigation and ceremonial 
uses pursuant to tikanga Māori (customary law). Their concerns exacerbated when 
settlers began to run steamboats up the river, and use the river for gravel extraction and 
tourism and later established a major hydroelectric scheme in the river’s upper reaches.  
 
The Waitangi Tribunal heard Māori historical claims that the Crown had breached its 
Treaty obligations in relation to the river in the 1990s, which they reported on in 1999.44 
Extensive evidence was led before the Tribunal about the river interests of the 
Whanganui Iwi under tikanga Māori (Māori customary law). In its findings, the 
Tribunal framed the interests of the Whanganui Iwi in the river in terms of ‘ownership’. 
The Māori interest was ‘territorial’ in nature as a ‘single and indivisible entity’ in 
contrast to western conceptions of property in separate natural resources. The Tribunal 
explained:45 
 
<quote>In Maori terms, the Whanganui River is a water resource, a single and 
indivisible entity comprised of water, banks, and bed. There is nothing unexpected in 
that. It is obvious that a river exists as a water regime and not as a dry bed. The 
conceptual understanding of the river as a tupuna or ancestor emphasises the Maori 
thought that the river exists as a single and undivided entity or essence. Rendering the 
native title in its own terms, then, what Atihaunui owned was a river, not a bed, and a 
river entire, not dissected into parts.</quote> 
 
The tribunal’s interpretation of Māori rights in the river also incorporated physical as 
well as metaphysical aspects of a total river territory:46 
 
<quote>The river was central to Atihaunui lives, their source of food, their single 
highway, their spiritual mentor. It was the aortic artery of the Atihaunui heart. Shrouded 
in history and tradition, the river remains symbolic of Atihaunui identity. It is the focal 
point for the Atihaunui people, whether living there or away. Numerous marae still line 
its shores.</quote> 
 
43 See eg In re the Bed of the Wanganui River [1962] NZLR 600. 
44 Waitangi Tribunal (n 42). 
45 ibid 337. 
46 ibid xiii. 
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Almost two decades passed until the Whanganui Iwi reached a political settlement with 
the Crown for their historical grievances in relation to the river. 47  However, the 
negotiations were highly contentious, as under New Zealand common law no one can 
‘own’ water, which is vested in the crown on behalf of the New Zealand public.48 The 
controversy around water ownership is academic, given that the Crown vested the right 
to use and control water in itself, and allocates rights to take and use water from the 
river which have many of the incidents of ‘property’. Under the Resource Management 
Act consent authorities, usually local municipal councils, make decisions to grant a 
‘resource consent’ to take and use water on a ‘first come, first served’ basis.49 These 
consents are temporal, applying only up to 35 years, but they are of immense value, 
allowing commercial use of and benefit from water, including for activities such as 
agriculture, tourism and hydropower development. 
 
Thus, the Te Awa Tupua Act is a reparative political settlement to one of New Zealand’s 
longest-running disputes over river management and ownership, as a consequence of 
historical dispossession, environmental degradation and inequitable development. 
Sanders has argued that the Te Awa Tupua model is essentially a ‘constitution’, which 
restructures the relationship between the Crown and Māori.50 This new relationship 
between Whanganui Iwi and the Crown in the Te Awa Tupua model is made within the 
reparative justice model arising out of the Treaty of Waitangi. Yet, interestingly, the 
model is provided for outside of New Zealand’s core constitutional documents, such as 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990,51 which includes no recognition or protection 
of the Treaty of Waitangi or its principles, indigenous or cultural rights, or even 
environmental rights or the rights of nature.52 
 
 
47 ‘Ruruku Whakatupua: Whanganui River Deed of Settlement between the Crown and Whanganui Iwi 
(March 2014)’. 
48 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 (NZ) s 21; Coal Mines Amendment Act 1903 (NZ) s 14; 
Water Power Act 1903 (NZ) ss 2, 5; Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) s 354. 
49 Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) s 14. 
50 Sanders (n 3) 5, 34. 
51 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ). 
52 This can be contrasted with the Colombian model, discussed below. 
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In the New Zealand context, political settlements about rivers (and water more 
generally) are not new.53 The Waitangi Tribunal has inquired into, and the Crown has 
negotiated and settled, claims to rivers and lakes many times over the past 40 years, 
including for the Waikato River, which was recognised as a ‘living ancestor’ and 
‘indivisible whole’ in a similar way to Te Awa Tupua, albeit without legal personality.54 
Previous river settlements have focused on giving Māori rights of ‘co-management’, or 
a right to actively participate in the governance and regulation of rivers, together with 
the Crown, consistent with the Treaty principle of partnership (a relationship typically 
described by the Māori concept of ‘kaitiakitanga’ or guardianship).  
 
However, as will be discussed below, the Te Awa Tupua Act goes further than previous 
river settlements, and specifically declares that the river is a legal person. Following 
the recognition of Te Urewera forest as a legal person in the political settlement for 
another Waitangi Tribunal claim in 2014,55 the Te Awa Tupua Act represents a new 
approach in cultural redress and, ultimately, governance frameworks for natural 
resources in New Zealand. 
 
<B>3.2 The Te Awa Tupua model  
 
Rather than treating the river as a resource to be exploited by the people of the 
Whanganui, the Te Awa Tupua Act positions the Whanganui Iwi as interdependent 
with and owing responsibilities to the river. Yet, despite the appearance of ecocentrism, 
the river’s rights under the Te Awa Tupua Act are intrinsically tied up with the rights 
of the Whanganui Iwi and their indigenous cultural ‘difference’.56  
 
The Te Awa Tupua Act recognises the status of the Whanganui River (and its tributaries) 
as ‘an indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui River from the 
mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical and meta-physical elements’.57 This 
 
53 Jacinta Ruru ‘Indigenous restitution in settling water claims: the developing cultural and commercial 
redress opportunities in Aotearoa, New Zealand’ (2013) 2 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 311, 340; 
Irons Magallanes (n 9) 309. 
54 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010 (NZ). 
55 Te Urewera Act 2014 (NZ). 
56 See Irons Magallanes (n 9) 273; Sanders (n 3). 
57 Te Awa Tupua Act s 12. 
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framing of Te Awa Tupua comes from the tikanga Māori of the Whanganui Iwi,58 and 
may be contrasted with western, liberal conceptions of natural resources as divisible 
subjects for propertisation and regulation. Such is apparent from the inclusion of 
‘metaphysical’ elements of the river in its status, together with the physical. As an 
interesting coincidence, the river’s conceptualisation as an ‘indivisible and living whole’ 
also aligns with an ‘integrated catchment’ approach to river regulation, at the entire 
basin level, now considered to be best practice in water resource management.59 
 
The Te Awa Tupua Act then ‘declares’ that Te Awa Tupua is a ‘legal person’, which 
has ‘all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person’. 60  The use of 
‘declares’ here is interesting, as it avoids the use of ‘recognises’, used in section 12 
(when recognising that the river is ‘Te Awa Tupua’). In this way the Act recognises the 
pre-existing status of the river as Te Awa Tupua, but avoids expressly recognising that 
the river is already (intrinsically or justifiably) a legal person. By using the word 
‘declares’, instead perhaps of the word ‘grant’, the Act also avoids the other extreme of 
being seen to confer legal personality on the river, leaving open the possibility that 
someone might argue that a river may be a person in tikanga Māori regardless of 
whether or not the state recognises it as such. 
 
As mentioned above, the ‘rights powers, duties and liabilities’ of a legal person are 
known to be the rights to sue, be sued, enter into contracts and hold property. Of course, 
the river itself cannot appear in court or purchase land, so the Te Awa Tupua Act creates 
a representative, called ‘Te Pou Tupua’, who must act in the river’s interests. The 
‘office’ of Te Pou Tupua established by the Act is the ‘human face’ of the river to act 
and speak for and on behalf of Te Awa Tupua, as a river guardian.61 One representative 
is to be nominated by the Crown and the other by the Whanganui Iwi.  
 
The guardian model accords with the ecocentric approach to natural resource 
management, with Stone having proposed guardians to protect the legal rights of 
 
58 Hutchison (n 14) 180. 
59 Lee Godden ‘The role of law at multiple levels’ in Janice Gray, Cameron Holley and Rosemary 
Rayfuse Trans-jurisdictional Water Law and Governance (Earthscan 2016) 27–28. 
60 Te Awa Tupua Act s 14. 
61 ibid ss 18–19. 
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nature.62 However, in New Zealand’s indigenous rights context, use of the guardian 
model is a typical implementation of the principles of kaitiakitanga and partnership 
with Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi.63 The guardianship model adopted in Te Pou 
Tupua certainly goes further than the previous applications of the treaty principles of 
kaitiakitanga and partnership in co-management arrangements for natural resources, in 
which central government or local/regional authorities share public administration of 
natural resources with Māori groups.64 Te Pou Tupua gives Māori a stronger role in 
river management, and in this sense goes further to recognise Māori rights of tino-
rangatiratanga or self-government,65 as an equal guardian partner. The two guardians, 
former Member of Parliament Dame Tariana Turia and educator Turama Hawira, were 
appointed in September 2017 and hold office for three years.66 Interestingly, neither of 
the guardians currently works for the Crown and both have links to the Whanganui, 
suggesting the importance of a perception of legitimacy for the appointment of river 
guardians as having local, indigenous expertise and authority. 
 
Te Pou Tupua has broad powers although it must act in the interests of the river and 
consistently with prescribed values for the river’s management. These values (called 
‘Tupua te Kawa’) are set out in section 13 of the Act, described as the ‘intrinsic values 
that represent the essence of Te Awa Tupua’. These values are highly significant as 
they help us to understand the content of the river’s rights.67 Administrative decision 
makers under a range of legislation affecting river regulation (including, notably, the 
Resource Management Act 1991) must recognise, provide for and have regard to the 
status of Te Awa Tupua as a legal person and the statutory river values, as a ‘relevant 
consideration’.68 However, the Te Awa Tupua Act acknowledges that decisions made 
under other legislation must be exercised consistent with the purpose of that legislation 
 
62 Stone (n 11). 
63 Irons Magallanes (n 9) 281. 
64 See eg Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010 (NZ); Resource 
Management Act 1991 (NZ) ss 6, 7 and 8 and the new Mana Whakahono ā Rohe arrangements under 
ss 58O–58U. 
65 Such rights are reflected in the guarantee of tino rangatiratanga under art 2 of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. 
66 Zaryd Wilson ‘Whanganui River representatives appointed’ NZ Herald (5 September 2017) 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11916893. 
67 Good (n 8) 35–36. Good discusses the difficulty, once rights for nature are recognised, of 
determining the content of such rights in the absence of the river’s ability to speak for itself. 
68 Te Awa Tupua Act s 15. 
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and neither Te Awa Tupua status nor Tupua te Kawa can be determining factors in an 
administrative decision,69 engendering a perception of ‘rubber stamping’. 
 
The statutory river values, ‘Tupua te Kawa’, acknowledge the river as a source of 
spiritual and physical sustenance, feeding the resources within it and people living 
alongside it.70 They recognise the direct link between the health of the river and the 
health of the people, reflecting evidence presented before the Waitangi Tribunal leading 
up to the settlement of contamination of river health and spirituality negatively affecting 
the health of the people.71 The values reiterate that the river is an indivisible and living 
whole from the mountains to the sea incorporating physical and metaphysical elements. 
They also acknowledge responsibility of the Whanganui Iwi for the river’s health 
(guardianship), that the large and small streams form one river (integrated catchment 
management), and the common purpose of all elements and entities in the river working 
towards the river’s health and wellbeing (collaborative governance). 
 
Finally, the Te Awa Tupua Act establishes a complicated, collaborative governance 
regime for the river between Māori, municipal and central government and private 
users.72 In this regime a range of entities are created, and a range of perspectives 
covered, not just those of Te Pou Tupua or the Whanganui Iwi. These are: ‘Te Karewao’, 
an advisory group to Te Pou Tupua consisting of representatives of Māori river 
communities and authorities and relevant local authorities; 73  ‘Te Kōpuka’, a 
collaborative strategy group for Te Awa Tupua comprising representatives of persons 
and organisations with interests in the Whanganui River, including iwi, relevant local 
authorities, departments of State, commercial and recreational users, and environmental 
groups;74 and ‘Te Heke Ngahuru’, a strategy for the collaboration of persons with 
interests in the Whanganui River, in order to address and advance the health and well-
being of Te Awa Tupua.75 
 
 
69 ibid s 15(5). 
70 ibid s 13(a). 
71 Waitangi Tribunal (n 42) 79. 
72 See Sanders (n 3) 30. For a discussion of collaborative governance see Cameron Harrington ‘The 
political ontology of collaborative water governance’ (2017) 42(3) Water International 254. 
73 Te Awa Tupua Act s 27. 
74 ibid s 29. 
75 ibid s 35. 
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How, exactly, the various governance arrangements will operate in practice is yet to be 
seen, as the surrounding policy framework has not been fully developed and some of 
the governance bodies are yet to be established. However, New Zealand’s natural 
resources planning framework is undoubtedly significantly affected by the Te Awa 
Tupua Act in Whanganui River territory, and there are 24 cross references from the Te 
Awa Tupua Act to the Resource Management Act 1991. These include that Te Awa 
Tupua is to be treated as a public authority for the purposes of the Resource 
Management Act 1991.76 Notably, the consent of Te Pou Tupua is not required for 
applications for resource consent to use the river’s water under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (its consent is required to use the river bed), although a consent 
authority may determine that Te Pou Tupua is an ‘affected person’.77 Interestingly, even 
if Te Pou Tupua as an ‘affected person’ gives its consent to certain activity being carried 
out on the river the consent authority cannot disregard any effect of that activity on the 
river.78 This is a protection of the river’s interests over and above the guardianship of 
Te Pou Tupua, reinforcing the model’s ecocentric themes. 
 
What the Te Awa Tupua Act does not do is impact in any way on property interests in 
the river. The settlement is the culmination of more than a century of indigenous 
agitation for the right to ‘own’ the river, always resisted by the Crown on the basis that 
‘no one can own water’. Under the Act only the Crown-owned parts of the bed of the 
river is vested in Te Awa Tupua, and the settlement has no impact on public rights of 
use, fishing or navigation or private consents or permits to use the river, in a provision 
that specifically protects the rights of hydro-electric power generators as state-owned 
enterprises and mixed use model companies.79 In this way, the Te Awa Tupua Act 
follows the approach taken in a number of earlier settlements, which vested the beds of 
rivers and lakes in Māori groups and focused on co-management.  
 
<A>4 El Río Atrato: the Atrato River as a legal person in Colombia 
 
<B>4.1 Rivers and peoples in Chocó 
 
 
76 ibid s 17. 
77 Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) s 46(3). 
78 Te Awa Tupua Act s 63. 
79 Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) ss 41, 46. 
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The Atrato River is located in Colombia’s poorest and most forgotten region of 
Chocó.80 Running along the Pacific Coast of Colombia, Chocó is a place of rich natural 
resources and biodiversity and also, paradoxically, has been a site for conflict and 
contestation. In Chocó, almost half of the population lives in extreme poverty and the 
region has been ravaged by the internal war, plagued by the drug trade, and caught in 
the path of organised crime. The government of Colombia has not, historically, had a 
strong presence in Chocó, and its impoverished constituents face a daily struggle to 
meet their basic human needs. The reasons for Chocó’s plight have deep roots in 
Colombia’s colonial past. As Colombian researcher Jaime Bonet has pointed out, there 
are at least four key factors contributing to the crisis in Chocó: (i) a colonial legacy 
characterised by weak or inexistent political and administrative institutions; (ii) 
challenging geographic conditions and poor communication and access; (iii) an 
extractive economic structure based on the exploitation of natural resources (specially 
gold mining) for more than three centuries, and (iv) a complete isolation of the region 
from the country.81  
 
Chocó is also an ethnically and socially particular part of Colombia: 97 per cent of the 
population belongs to an indigenous or Afro-Colombian community 82  The ethnic 
communities occupy ‘ancestral’ territories, called resguardos (in the case of indigenous 
people) and consejos mayores (in the case of Afro-Colombian communities), practicing 
traditional forms of life including artisan mining of gold and silver, traditional 
agriculture, hunting and fishing, with which they have supported themselves for 
centuries.83 The Afro-descendant communities of Chocó were brought by the Spanish 
from Africa in the process of colonisation to boost the slave economy, replacing the 
‘weak’ and ‘sick’ indigenous workforce. Their first task was to extract gold from the 
Santa María de la Antigua del Darién mine in northern Chocó in 1510. 84  These 
communities enjoy a particular symbiosis with the indigenous communities, living off 
 
80 The Chocó region (Departamento de Chocó) has an extension of nearly 46,530 square kilometres. 
Chocó also has 30 ‘municipios’ (municipalities) in 5 sub-regions: Atrato, San Juan, Pacífico Norte, 
Baudó (Pacífico Sur) and Darién. Departamento Nacional de Estadística, ‘Censo General 2005: 
“Proyecciones Nacionales y Departamentales de Población 2005–2020”’ (2010). 
81 Jaime Bonet ‘¿Por qué es pobre el chocó? Documentos de Trabajo Sobre Economía Regional’ (90, 
Banco de la República, Bogotá, Centro de Estudios Económicos Regionales 2007). 
82 Departamento Nacional de Estadística (n 80). 
83 Jaime Bonet (n 81); Tierra Digna 2. 
84 Robert C West La Minería de Aluvión En Colombia Durante El Período Colonial (Imprenta 
Nacional de Colombia 1972). 
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the land and taking only limited part in mainstream Colombian society. The Afro-
descendant communities are contemplated by the concept of ‘tribal’ peoples, under the 
International Labour Organisation’s Convention No 169 Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries . 85  At a domestic level, the Colombian 
Constitutional Court has recognised the special character of the Afro--descendant 
communities (which they classify as ‘multiethnic and multicultural’) as a part of the 
social and ethnic diversity of the Colombian nation, of equal status to any other ethnic 
community.86  
 
The Atrato River, the longest and third most navigable in the country, winds its way 
750 km through Chocó from the Andes mountains (Cerro Plateado) to the gulf of Urabá 
in the Caribbean Sea. The river is part of a massive basin covering 40,000 square 
kilometres and 60 per cent of Chocó is fed by more than 15 rivers and 300 streams.87 
The people of Chocó who live alongside the Atrato River, much like the Whanganui 
Iwi in New Zealand, depend on the river for their physical, cultural and spiritual 
sustenance.88 They claim to have relationships with the Atrato basin not just as their 
ancestral territory, but as a ‘space to reproduce life and recreate culture’.89 For the 
Atrato communities the river is everything. It is their way of measuring time, the place 
where children play and learn how to swim, and the only highway to other parts of the 
region.90  
 
Chocó is considered to be ‘mega-biodiverse’; one of the most biodiverse places on the 
planet with 90 per cent of the region being protected forest area.91 There is also gold 
and silver in the river and artisanal mining has been practised in the region for many 
years (including by some Afro-descendant and indigenous communities). However, 
 
85 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No 169) (1989) 28 
ILM 1382 (entered into force 5 September 1991) (Convention 169) 169.  
86 Consejo Comunitario Mayor Cuenca Río Cacarica v Ministry of Environment and Others No T-955 
of 2003, Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Sala Octava de Revision [Eighth Chamber] 
(Colombia) (17 October 2003) 81.  
87 Tierra Digna 2–3; Juan Carlos Bello Atlas de La Biodiversidad de Colombia (Instituto Alexander 
von Humboldt 2000). 
88 Camilo Antonio Hernandez Ideas y Practicas Ambientales del Pueblo Embera del Chocó (Cerec 
1995) 12. 
89 Tierra Digna 165. 
90 Acta Final de Inspección Judicial, Appendix 1, Part B in Tierra Digna. 
91 Juan Carlos Bello (n 87). Ley 2 de 1959 ‘Por la cual se dictan normas sobre economía forestal de la 
Nación y conservación de recursos naturales renovables’. 
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since the 1990s, mechanised illegal mining and logging (without permit or concession 
from the state or the communities) has intensified along the river. The illegal mines 
dotted along the Atrato use dredges (called dragas y dragones by locals) and excavators 
in their activities, often operated by armed organised criminals (including guerrilla 
groups such as the extinct FARC-EP, and active organisations: ELN, paramilitary 
structures and drug dealers of the ‘Clan del Golfo’).92 The operators also use mercury 
and cyanide to assist the mining process. 
 
These activities have caused extreme degradation of the Atrato River. They have 
destroyed the natural course of the river and flooded the rainforest in many parts, and 
the river has become massively contaminated with dangerous chemicals killing fish and 
vegetation. The impact of this activity on the environmental condition of the river and 
the river relationships of the Atrato communities has been catastrophic. The Atrato 
people have suffered as the chemicals make their way into the food chain, traditional 
subsistence practices are disrupted and communities are displaced. All of this has 
occurred under the complacency of central government, regional and local authorities 
in Colombia, all of which have turned a blind eye to the environmental and 
humanitarian consequences. The Court calls this ‘a humanitarian, social and 
environmental crisis without precedent’.93 
 
In contrast to New Zealand, the protection of the environment, including indigenous 
relationships with natural resources, has constitutional status in Colombia.94 In fact, the 
protection of the environment is a founding principle of the core-concept of the 
Colombian Constitution, known as the Estado social de derecho. Since 1991, the 
Colombian Constitution has specifically provided for la Constitución Ecológica (the 
Ecological Constitution); a series of provisions intended to protect environmental 
 
92 César Rodriguez Garavito Etnicidad.Gov: Los Recursos Naturales, Los Pueblos Indígenas y El 
Derecho a La Consulta Previa En Los Campos Sociales Minados [Natural Resources, Indigenous 
Peoples and the Right of Prior Consultation in Mining Territories] (Centro de Estudios de Derecho, 
Justicia y Sociedad, Dejusticia 2012) 6–9; Alfredo Molano Bravo De Río En Río: Vistazo a Los 
Territorios Negros (Editorial Aguilar 2017). 
93 This investigation is documented by the Ombudsman Office of Colombia. Defensoría del Pueblo. 
“Crisis humanitaria en el Chocó: diagnóstico, valoración y acciones de la Defensoría del Pueblo” 
Bogotá (2014); “Resolución Defensorial 064 de 2014” Bogotá, Septiembre 2014; Tierra Digna 109. 
94 The ‘Ecological Constitution’ is integrated for more than 30 provisions (from preamble to article 
366) in a double dimension: (i) integral protection of the environment and (ii) guarantee of a 
sustainable development.  
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interests including both rights and obligations. 95  In particular, Articles 79 and 80 
recognise the collective right of all people to a healthy environment and the 
responsibility of the State to protect the diversity and integrity of the environment, 
conserve areas of special ecological importance, plan the management and use of 
natural resources to guarantee their sustainable development, conservation, restoration 
or substitution and prevent and control environmental deterioration.96 The Ecological 
Constitution has provided fertile ground for the reconceptualisation of natural resources 
such as rivers as legitimate rights-bearing entities in Colombia,97 and the recognition of 
the particular relationships indigenous communities hold with the natural world.98 
 
<B>4.2 The Atrato model 
 
The Río Atrato case was brought in the Constitutional Court in early 2015 by the human 
rights NGO Tierra Digna on behalf of a number of Indigenous, Afro-descendant and 
peasant communities in Chocó.99 The case was an ‘acción de tutela’ under article 86 of 
the Colombian Constitution for protection of the constitutional rights of the river 
communities, who argued that the activities of illegal miners in Chocó violated their 
fundamental rights to life, health, water, food security, healthy environment, culture 
and territory under the Constitution. Article 86 allows all Colombians to apply to any 
judge in the country or the Constitutional Court for an order for protection of their 
fundamental rights when they are vulnerable or threatened by an act of omission of a 
public or private authority. 
 
 
95 See Oscar Darío Amaya Navas La Constitución Ecológica de Colombia: Análisis Comparativo Con 
El Sistema Constitucional Latinoamericano (Universidad Externado de Colombia 2002). 
96 See also arts 1, 2, 8, 49, 79, 86, 88, 95, 333 and 366. 
97 An earlier case on river rights, although not adopting the concept of legal personality is the case of 
the Rio Bogota, in which the Council of State also made a series of very prescriptive orders in response 
to serious environmental contamination of the river. Consejo de Estado, Sala de Contencioso 
Administrativo, Sección Primera, 28 de Marzo 2014. See Luis Felipe Guzmán Jiménez Las Aguas 
Residuales En La Jurisprudencia Del Consejo de Estado: Periodo 2003-2014 [Wastewater in the 
Jurisprudence of the Administrative Court of Colombia: 2003-2014] (Universidad Externado de 
Colombia 2015) 18. 
98 Article 330 of the Colombian Constitution creates the indigenous territories (‘resguardos indígenas’) 
based on customary and ancestral indigenous law. 
99 The Centro de Estudios para la Justicia Social ‘Tierra Digna’ represented the following river 
communities: Consejo Comunitario Mayor de la Organización Popular Campesina del Alto Atrato 
(Cocomopoca), el Consejo Comunitario Mayor de la Asociación Campesina Integral del Atrato 
(Cocomacia), la Asociación de Consejos Comunitarios del Bajo Atrato (Asocoba), el Foro Inter-étnico 
Solidaridad Chocó (FISCH). 
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In its decision, the Court found that the government had violated all of the fundamental 
constitutional rights alleged to have been breached by the communities through its 
omission to control and eradicate illegal mining in Chocó. Then, significantly, the Court 
recognised that the Atrato River (together with its basin and tributaries) is an entidad 
sujeto de derechos (legal person). The Court did so with reference to the Whanganui 
River settlement in New Zealand, along with the Constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia. 
The Court determined that the river’s rights (distinct from the communities’ rights) are 
to protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration by the State and ethnic 
communities. 
 
The Court then made several prescriptive orders to implement its decision, including 
that the rights of the river will be represented by a guardian, with one representative 
from government and one from the claimant communities, much like the Te Awa Tupua 
model from New Zealand. The Court gave the President and the communities one 
month to each choose their representative, however, the 15 river guardians were 
eventually all appointed by the last week of August 2017. The President’s named 
representative is the Ministry for the Environment and Sustainable Development.100 
The seven river communities each appointed one male guardian and one female 
guardian to ensure gender equality, 101  another interesting manifestation of the 
importance of representative legitimacy for guardians within indigenous and Afro-
descendant communities. 
 
The judgment ordered the guardians to design and form a ‘commission of guardians of 
the Atrato river’ (within three months), involving the designated guardians plus an 
‘advisory group’ including the NGOs Humboldt Institute and WWF Colombia, both of 
whom developed a project for the protection of the river Bita in another part of the 
country (Vichada, Orinoquía region). This advisory group is similar in many respects 
to Te Karewao and Te Kōpuka for the Whanganui River. Even more interesting, the 
Court designed a special interdisciplinary-body to verify and evaluate the proper 
 
100 Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarollo Sostenible [Ministry for the Environment and Sustainable 
Development], ‘Decreto No. 1148 Por el cual se designa al representante de los derechos del Río 
Atrato en cumplimiento de la Sentencia T-622 de 2016 de la Corte Constitucional [Decree No 1148 
Designating the Representative of the Rights of the Atrato River Giving Effect to Sentence T-622 of 
2016 of the Constitutional Court] art 1. 
101 Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Todas y Todos Somos Guardianes Del Atrato! 
https://co.boell.org/es/2017/09/04/todas-y-todos-somos-guardianes-del-atrato. 
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execution of the orders called panel de expertos (expert commission) headed by the 
main public sector regulation body in the country, the Procuraduría General de la 
Nación. This panel is comprised of several experts from ethnic communities and public, 
private, academic and social (NGO) organisations to ensure that the Court’s orders are 
carried out correctly and in due time. 
 
The judgment also includes orders requiring a number of government departments and 
entitles and universities to get together to design and implement a plan to decontaminate 
the river.102 This order is similar to the collaboration of persons with interests in the 
Whanganui River in order to address and advance the health and well-being of Te Awa 
Tupua contemplated by the strategy Te Heke Ngahuru. Other orders require other 
government bodies, including the police, military and Ministry of Defence to develop 
a plan to neutralise and permanently eradicate illegal mining in Chocó. Finally, the 
judgment includes orders intended to support the recuperation of traditional forms of 
subsistence and food and further research into the effects of the contamination. Key to 
every part of the Atrato model is the Court’s requirement for mandatory participation 
of the ethnic communities at every step of design and execution of the orders. 
 
This 163-page decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia is a watershed moment 
for indigenous and environmental rights in Latin America. The deep theoretical 
reasoning of the Court in the decision is beautiful, and reflects the involvement of 
human rights NGOs and academics in the case. The Court engages with a long line of 
Colombian jurisprudence on indigenous, Afro-descendant and environmental rights. 
These include cases where the Constitutional Court has protected the collective rights 
of ethnic communities to survive, to have a territory, to manage natural resources for 
legal autonomy, to be consulted (ILO 169), to participate in development projects and 
to enjoy a healthy environment. These cases rely upon the Ecological Constitution, and 
the guarantee of human dignity (vida digna), common welfare (bienestar general) and 
social justice (‘justicia social’); three concepts that are at the core of the Colombian 
constitutional model: el Estado social de derecho (a state of ‘social development’).  
 
 
102 Tierra Digna 159. 
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Yet, interestingly, the Court draws heavily on conceptions of indigenous resource rights 
in international law and jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
In arriving at legal personality for the river the Court relies on concepts of indigenous 
and environmental rights in ILO Convention No 169,103 United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,104 the Convention on Biodiversity,105 the American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 106  the UNESCO Convention on 
intangible property107 and the human right to water,108 before discussing leading cases 
Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay,109 Awas Tingni,110 Saramaka v Suriname.111 The Court’s 
outward looking approach to Colombian constitutional development also references 
domestic comparative law from within and beyond the Latin American civil law 
perspective including the Whanganui River and Te Urewera in New Zealand, and rights 
for nature in Ecuador and Bolivia. This ‘internationalisation’ of rights for nature in the 
Atrato decision is interesting, given the relative silence from international law on the 
topic of legal rights for rivers.  
 
The Court explicitly recognises that it is taking an ‘ecocentric’ approach in its analysis, 
referring to the interconnectedness of humans with nature, the superior interest of the 
environment, and human obligations to protect nature’s rights. In this sense the Court 
explains:112 
 
<quote>Nature and environment is a cross-cutting theme in the Colombian 
constitutional order. Its importance is obviously due to the human beings who inhabit 
it and the need to have a healthy environment to lead a dignified life in conditions of 
 
103 ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 169 (ILO 
Convention No 169). 
104 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples A/RES/61/295 
(13 September 2007). 
105 Convention on Biological Diversity (opened for signature 5 June 1992) 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into 
force 29 December 1993) (Convention on Biological Diversity). 
106 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) ‘American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’. 
107 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 
MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14 (adopted 17 October 2003). 
108 ‘United Nations Resolution on the Human Right to Water and Sanitation GA Dec 64/292, 64th Sess, 
108th Plen Mtg UN Doc A/RES/64/292 (28 July 2010)’. 
109 Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay IACHR Series C No 146 (29 March 2006) (Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay). 
110 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua IACHR Series C No 79 (31 August 
2001) (Mayagna v Nicaragua). 
111 Saramaka People v Suriname (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) IACHR 
Series C No 172 (28 November 2007). 
112 Tierra Digna 42. 
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well-being, but is also for the other living organisms with which the planet is shared, 
understood as entities worthy of protection in of themselves. This means being 
conscious of the interdependence that connects all living things on the Earth; that is, to 
recognise that we are integral parts of the global ecosystem and biosphere, before 
applying normative categories of domination, simple exploitation or utility.</quote> 
 
However, the decision is ‘anthropocentric’ in the sense that the river’s rights are 
incidental to the recognition of the communities’ human rights and this case is 
inherently tied up with the ancestral, territorial, communal and ‘biocultural rights’113 of 
the ethnic communities. The Court goes on to say:114 
 
<quote>This approach has a special relevance in Colombian constitutionalism, keeping 
in mind the principle of cultural and ethnic pluralism that supports it, together with the 
ancestral knowledge, use and customs of indigenous and tribal peoples. Accordingly, 
in the following paragraph we explore an alternative vision of the collective rights of 
the ethnic communities in relationship to their cultural and natural surroundings, which 
are called, ‘biocultural rights’.</quote> 
 
The Constitutional Court recognises the inescapable connection between the rights of 
nature and the rights of humans as biocultural rights, the basis of which is the ‘profound 
unity between nature and the human species’.115 
 
The detail and strength of the orders in the Atrato case demonstrate a certain judicial 
activism to obligate the executive branch of government to take action to respond to the 
serious environmental and humanitarian crisis in the river territory. This is particularly 
interesting because the government had no hand in the contamination, and only acted 
by omission. However, is the duty of the Colombian State (and not just the current 
 
113 The term ‘biocultural rights’ denotes a community's long-established right, in accordance with its 
customary laws, to steward its lands, waters and resources. Such rights are being increasingly 
recognised in international environmental law. Biocultural rights are not simply claims to property, in 
the typical market sense of property being a universally commensurable, commodifiable and alienable 
resource; rather, biocultural rights are collective rights of communities to carry out traditional 
stewardship roles vis-à-vis nature, as conceived of by indigenous ontologies. See K Bavikatte and T 
Bennett ‘Community stewardship: the foundation of biocultural rights’ (2015) 6(1) Journal of Human 
Rights and the Environment; Gabriel Nemogá ‘Limitada protección de la diversidad biocultural de la 
nación’ in Encuentro Constitucional por la Tierra (2014).  
114 Tierra Digna 42. 
115 ibid 47; Bavikatte and Bennett (n 113); Nemogá (n 113).  
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government) to ensure a plural society based on the respect of ethnic communities and 
the implementation of the concept of Estado social de derecho taking into account: (i) 
the diversity of cultures, races and ethnic identities that coexist in the country; (ii) the 
guarantee of equal rights and respect for everyone; (iii) the fact that the ethnic 
communities are part of the Colombian nation as pre-existing tribes and, (iv) 
importantly, the right of indigenous and Afro-descendant communities to have a 
territory and a life with justice and dignity.  
 
<A>5 River persons in context 
 
<B>5.1 The rights of people versus the rights of nature 
 
Much has been made of the ecocentric qualities of legal person models, in prioritising 
the rights of nature over the rights of people. However, the idea of rivers as legal persons 
in both New Zealand and Colombia, although emerging from and existing within very 
different circumstances, is more helpfully understood with reference to legal and 
cultural pluralism.116 In each country, legal personality is a mechanism adopted by the 
state to recognise river interests and relationships existing in indigenous and tribal 
customs and laws. This approach may have limitations, including the risk of 
‘essentialising’ indigenous culture in a pristine, tribal, subsistence, environmental, or 
pre-contact light,117 and leaving open the question whether the rights of nature can exist 
outside of such a cultural context. The approach may also create tensions with the idea 
of ‘ethno-development’, which has underpinned indigenous activism at a regional level 




116 The development of the rights of nature in Ecuador and Bolivia has also occurred within a context 
of legal and cultural pluralism, via the concept of buen vivir – to live a good life. See generally Tom 
Perreault ‘Tendencies in tension: resource governance and social contradictions in contemporary 
Bolivia’ in Lori Leonard (ed) Governing Resource Extraction (Routledge 2017); Craig M Kauffman 
and Pamela L Martin ‘Can rights of nature make development more sustainable? Why some 
Ecuadorian lawsuits succeed and others fail’ (2017) 92 World Development 130. 
117 See above for a discussion of the risk of essentialising indigenous culture in the legal pluralism 
literature. 
118 See Engle (n 33). Note that the Constitutional Court in the Atrato case actually refers to the idea of 
ethno-development in support of its approach. Tierra Digna 155. 
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The idea of extending legal personality to the Whanganui River cannot be divorced 
from its cultural context, as part of a political settlement with Whanganui Iwi intended 
to repair past wrongs and recognise Māori relationships with water.119 The Te Awa 
Tupua model reflects the conceptualisation of the relationship between humans and the 
natural world in the tikanga (law) of the Whanganui Iwi.120 According to their tikanga, 
the river has rights to which the Iwi belong and not the other way round, exemplified 
in the Iwi’s idiom: ‘I am the river, and the river is me’.  
 
The Constitutional Court of Columbia’s recognition of the ‘biocultural’ rights of the 
Atrato communities also highlights the role of legal and cultural pluralism in the legal 
person idea. The Court frames the ethnic communities’ rights as the right ‘to administer 
and exercise trusteeship in an autonomous manner over their territories – in accordance 
with their own laws and customs’.121 The Court points out that these ‘biocultural rights’ 
‘are not new rights for the ethnic communities’, but rather a category that unifies their 
interconnected rights in natural resources and to culture. 122  This conceptualisation 
resembles recognition models including native or aboriginal title, where state law 
recognises and gives effect to pre-existing indigenous laws and customs.123 
 
Both the Colombian and New Zealand models are therefore anthropocentric in the sense 
that they create new relationships between the state and communities,124 in recognition 
of the culturally-specific guardianship relationship between communities and nature. 
However, it is clear from the legal pluralism literature that when states ‘recognise’ 
indigenous rights and interests, there is an inevitable process of translation, 
accommodation and mediation.125 Legal personality is a mechanism used to recognise 
indigenous and tribal relationships and jurisdictions to manage the natural world. 
However, the jurisdiction is not recognised in its complete form, and is actually limited 
under the process of recognition.  
 
 
119 See Irons Magallanes (n 9) 325–26; Sanders (n 3). 
120 Sanders (n 3) 4. 
121 Tierra Digna 43. 
122 ibid 44. 
123 See above. 
124 See Sanders (n 3) 34. 
125 See above. 
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The claims made by Māori to the Whanganui River had always been framed as rights 
of ‘ownership’, and the Waitangi Tribunal inquiring into those claims did not mention 
‘rights for nature’ or ‘legal personality’. It framed Māori interests in the river under 
tikanga Māori as ‘proprietary’ and ‘territorial’ rights to the entire catchment and all its 
resources based on ancestry.126 However, in the political compromise that is the Te Awa 
Tupua Act, no one has the right to ‘own’ the river as a whole.127 The failure to give the 
river the legal right to its own water creates a paradox. How can Te Awa Tupua be an 
‘indivisible and living whole from the mountains to the sea incorporating physical and 
metaphysical elements’128 and yet carved up into different proprietary regimes for the 
bed, water, wildlife etc? How can the Te Awa Tupua Act be put forward by some 
proponents as illustrative of the dichotomy between property in nature and rights for 
nature,129 when the model has no impact on underlying (and overlapping) legal rights 
regimes?130 
 
The Te Awa Tupua Model, at once recognising and limiting an indigenous jurisdiction, 
is simply an advanced collaborative governance approach, in which the interests of the 
river are emphasised in its regulation by the government, Māori and other community 
and business interests. As Sanders rightly points out, the legal person model is a new 
‘constitutional’ framework to ‘regulate human relationships’ and establish a forum for 
disagreement and compromise: recognising the competing claims of the crown and 
Māori to political authority.131  
 
In Colombia, while the Atrato communities’ biocultural rights are positioned as being 
territorial in nature,132 and although the indigenous and Afro-descendant communities 
successfully claimed a failure to protect their right to ‘territory’, the Court does not 
recognise a right of property for the communities in the river, nor for the river to own 
 
126 Waitangi Tribunal (n 42) 337, 343. 
127 Laura Hardcastle ‘Turbulent times: speculations about the Whanganui River’s position as a legal 
entity’ (2014) Maori Law Review http://maorilawreview.co.nz/2014/02/sir-edward-taihakurei-durie-
student-essay-competition-2013-turbulent-times-speculations-about-the-whanganui-rivers-position-as-
a-legal-entity/; Sanders (n 3) 28–29.  
128 Te Awa Tupua Act s 12. 
129 Hutchison (n 14); Margil (n 14) 8. 
130 Macpherson and O’Donnell (n 3). 
131 Sanders (n 3) 1. 
132 Tierra Digna 45, 48–56. 
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itself. In this regard the Atrato case, like that of the Whanganui River is much more 
about water governance than it is about water property. 
 
The Colombian case emerges squarely from the strong constitutional protection of 
indigenous and environmental rights, and a rich national and international 
jurisprudence regarding indigenous rights to natural resources in Latin America. The 
case is, therefore, underpinned by the fundamental rights people have with respect to 
the natural world, and the Constitutional Court of Colombia uses human rights 
protections (the right to life, to water, to live in a clean environment, etc) to reach its 
result. The Court is developing rights for nature in the Colombian constitutional context 
as an extension of human rights law, similar to the way in which Latin American cases 
have used the protection of indigenous ‘territory’ by expanding the right to 
‘property’.133 It even refers to the rights of nature as the ‘third generation’ of human 
rights, after civil and political and then economic social and cultural rights.134  
 
In the New Zealand context, the Te Awa Tupua model does not rest on core 
constitutional human rights documents, although as part of the Treaty of Waitangi 
reparative framework, it certainly shows how human rights doctrine develops (arguably 
more effectively) outside of core human rights laws. The extension of the human rights 
paradigm in both Colombia and New Zealand further highlights the simplicity of the 
traditional dichotomy of an earth versus human centred model. 
 
<B>5.2 Institutions and enforceability 
 
Enforcing rights for nature has been problematic in comparative contexts. In Ecuador, 
for example, protections of the rights of nature (and the concept of buen vivir) have 
been erratically implemented by courts,135 and are often described as ‘weak’, although 
they are gradually having greater policy impact in decision-making processes. 136 The 
 
133 See eg Mayagna v Nicaragua. 
134 Tierra Digna 137. 
135 Mary Elizabeth Whittemore ‘Problem of enforcing nature’s rights under Ecuador’s constitution: 
why the 2008 environmental amendments have no bite’ (2011) 3 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 
659. 
136 Craig M Kauffman and Pamela L Martin, ‘Can Rights of Nature Make Development More 
Sustainable? Why Some Ecuadorian Lawsuits Succeed and Others Fail’ (2017) 92 World Development 
130, 138. 
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broad protection of the rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia, too, has had little practical 
impact in preventing environmentally damaging development.137 It is too early to tell 
how river rights will be upheld in the New Zealand and Colombian cases, however, 
their architects have clearly given more thought to the challenges of implementation 
and enforceability in both approaches.  
 
The adoption of legal personality as a model for recognising rights of natural resources 
is itself a response to the problem of enforceability. The Ecuadorian and Bolivian 
models have been erratic in their implementation because it is not clear who has 
standing to take action to uphold nature’s rights. Both the Whanganui and Atrato 
models tackle this ambiguity head on, and rather than simply recognising that rivers 
can be rights-bearing, the institution of the legal person is created, and the rights attach 
to the institution as a person. As a legal person a river can take legal action in its own 
name if necessary to respond to environmental threat or promote environmental 
outcomes. Te Awa Tupua, for example, might assert its interests as a legal person in 
the future by applying for a water conservation order under Part 9 of the Resource 
Management Act 1991 to protect the river. If the Colombian government fails to stamp 
out illegal mining, the guardians of the Río Atrato might return to the Constitutional 
Court on the river’s behalf. 
 
Much more significant than the creation of the legal fiction of personality for rivers, is 
the institutional framework accompanying it to protect and manage river rights by 
partnership, consensus and collaboration. The Atrato case engages directly with the 
difficulty of enforcing the rights of nature, by making prescriptive orders about how the 
river’s rights must be protected and implemented and giving itself an ongoing role, via 
regular reports on implementation from the government. It is remarkable how far the 
Court has gone in designing institutions to represent the river; inspired by the Te Pou 
Tupua model, the principle of guardianship, and collaborative governance approach in 
New Zealand law.  
 
The Te Awa Tupua Act also contains extensive and prescriptive guidance about how 
the river’s rights must be implemented, administered and upheld via a range of 
 
137 Perreault (n 116) 18. 
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collaborative governance institutions. However, without the river holding any legal 
right to use its water, and in the context of strong public and private use rights, it is easy 
to envisage difficulty in prioritising the river’s rights. What would happen if a 
hydroelectric power generator exercised a valid resource consent to use water from the 
Whanganui River in a manner that impacted negatively on the river’s physical or 
spiritual health? How could Te Pou Tupua agitate for environmental outcomes for the 
river when the river itself is not a water right-holder and Te Pou Tupua is not a decision-
maker with respect to water? The Te Awa Tupua Act, be it constitutional in nature or 
otherwise, is an ordinary statute, unable to override rights granted under other 
legislation. There is yet to be any litigation over the legislation. However, given the 
potential for conflict over water sharing, the success of the Te Awa Tupua model will 
depend not only on strong collaborative governance, but on the ability of the courts to 
resolve disputes. Hopefully, the ongoing proprietary claims Māori maintain to water 
throughout New Zealand will be resolved in the near future.138  
 
Macpherson and O’Donnell have argued that, in order for grants of legal personality to 
provide opportunities for improved environmental outcomes, they must be 
accompanied by strong and independent institutions to enforce the river’s interests, 
clearly expressed river values to hold representatives accountable, and legal rights to 
use the river.139 If others have legal or proprietary interests in rivers and the river does 
not, the scope for enhancing environmental values in river regulation is seriously 
undermined. However, apart from potential legal avenues for redress proffered by legal 
standing, the recognition of a river as a ‘person’ enables a crucial cultural shift in the 
way we think about rivers.140 Such is apparent in the tikanga Māori behind the Tupua 
te Kawa (river values) adopted for the Whanganui River and the Constitutional Court 
of Colombia’s deference to the relationship of the Atrato communities with the river as 
a ‘space to reproduce life and recreate culture’.141 This cultural shift could subversively 
change our approach to managing rivers, in policy development and before the courts. 
 
 
138 For a discussion of Māori substantive claims to water rights see Waitangi Tribunal ‘The interim 
report on the national freshwater and geothermal resources claim’ (Waitangi Tribunal 2012) 
http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/doclibrary/public/reports/generic/Wai2358/Wai2358W.pdf. 
139 Macpherson and O’Donnell (n 3). 
140 ibid. 





In this article the recognition of rivers as legal persons in Aotearoa New Zealand 
(Whanganui River) and Colombia (Río Atrato) has been interrogated. Although the 
legal, political, historical and cultural context for recognition is different in each 
country, an analysis of the cases presents some interesting conceptual correlations, 
which help us to understand this emerging transnational idea that a river can be a person. 
It has been found in both cases that recognising that the river is a person is an 
accommodation of diverse legal and cultural interests in the river, in order to establish 
a new relationship between the state and river communities in the interests of improved 
river governance. Whether either model results in improved river outcomes, or 
increased indigenous or community jurisdiction to govern, turns not on the fiction that 
the river is a person but on the surrounding institutional framework, which has been 
carefully designed to engender enforceability. This is a significant finding because it 
shows that traditional dichotomies that draw lines between human-centred and earth-
centred laws or as the object versus the subject of property or rights fail to capture what 
legal personality entails. Legal person models are certainly context-specific, but further 
comparative studies of the Colombian and New Zealand models is needed to examine 
if and how legal personality improves river governance and state-community 
relationships, not just for future generations but for the entire human species.142 
 
 
142 ibid 137. 
